Affinity instead of identity

I continually see group identity both asserted and embraced in incontrovertible terms. It looks like this: (using myself as an example)

In my experience, few things are so easily defined. And too often, I see conversations derail over a disagreement on what is what.

I see groups as an emergent construct from a gestalt of opinions. For each group, every person has their own opinion about both (a) every other person's inclusion and (b) their own affinity to it. I find that, upon interrogating these opinions, three structures appear:

  1. Internalised affinity: a group someone includes themselves within
  2. In-group embrace: anyone who includes someone in “their” group
  3. Out-group assertion: anyone who includes someone in a group they exclude themselves from

Examples

“Scott is male”

  1. I see myself as male, though I feel no particular affinity to many context's perspectives on masculinity.
  2. Most men agree I am male, though I am often ostricised from male contexts.
  3. Most non-men agree I'm male, and as such I agreeably self-select myself out of male-exclusionary contexts.

The bounds of each structure is tight. “How” male I am has never been questioned. I consider myself lucky, in this regard.

“Scott is American”

  1. I see myself as American.
  2. Most other Americans agree.
  3. Most non-Americans agree.

The bounds of each structure are less tight. “How” American I am is a rare topic, reserved for detailed-oriented conversations like: “will you still be American after you get an Australian citizenship,” “don't say American because it's offensive to people from the rest of the Americas,” and American white nationalists.

Funny story: once at a comedy gig a comedian asked if there were any Americans in the audience. I raised my hand. The comedian takes one look at me and replies, “wrong kind of American.”

“Scott is Black”

  1. I see myself as Black, if “Black” means a descendant of the African-American diaspora.
  2. Blackness is highly contextual; in many contexts people who see themselves as Black would not see me as so, or at best conditionally embrace me.
  3. Blackness is highly contextual; in many contexts, I'm not considered by non-Blacks as Black.

The bounds of each structure are less tight. “How” Black I am is a common topic, especially as I don't live within the United States. “Blackness” in some contexts is a patrimonial legal construct, where instead I am “white.”

Funny story: a close friend of mine in Taiwan asked me if I thought I was Black, and upon hearing my affirmative response, replies “but you're coffee coloured!”

Another funny story: two men in Ethiopia once stressed that I was Ethiopian— not Black— and that my family had obviously either forgotten or lost our heritage.

How real is a belief?

I've focused on social identity in the above examples. But I find this model useful to gauge the “realness” of things. The tighter the bounds, the more real; the looser the bounds, the less real.

How real are the following items? (taken from 2022-12-19's nytimes.com frontpage)

In Practice

This is a tech note, so let's get technical.

The above is an argument that incontrovertible identity can be both convenient and an inaccurate representation of reality.

Consider these two choices:

  1. An Account with:
    • An Email Address field
  2. An Account with:
    • A has-one relationship named “preferred address” to an Email Address
    • A has-many relationship named “addresses” to an Email Addresses

We should prefer option two, despite it being more up-front work to do.